In India, the practice of demanding dowry and filing false dowry cases against a spouse is a serious offense that can have severe consequences for both parties involved. False dowry cases are often filed to extort money or to harass the spouse and their family members, causing significant harm and mental distress. In response, the Indian government has enacted laws to protect women from dowry-related abuse and to provide a legal basis for seeking divorce based on false dowry cases.

Under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code, it is a criminal offense to subject a woman to cruelty, which includes physical or mental harassment for dowry. In addition, the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 criminalizes the demand for dowry and provides for penalties for those found guilty of such offenses. Spouses who are subjected to false dowry cases can use these laws as a basis for seeking a divorce.

In the case of K. Srinivas v. K. Sunita (2014), the court held that the filing of false dowry cases against a spouse is a form of cruelty that can be a ground for divorce. The court stated that false dowry cases are a serious offense that can cause significant harm and distress to the targeted spouse and their family members. The court also noted that filing false dowry cases can lead to an erosion of trust and respect in the marital relationship, which can have long-term consequences.

G. Suhasini vs. G. Vinod Kumar Reddy (21.09.2022 – TLHC)

The main grievance of the petitioner is that the respondent has subjected him to cruelty and his case is that the respondent is of suspicious nature and that whenever he receives any phone call, she created big violence and used to quarrel with him. It appears that due to burns injuries, she may be suffering from inferiority complex, and used to quarrel, and also suspect the petitioner. The further grievance of the petitioner is that she demanded for separation from his parents and she also threatened to lodge false complaints and that she used to make simple issues into complicated and that every day she used to quarrel with him and that ultimately left the matrimonial home on 3.12.2010 and though he made efforts before well-wishers and community elders for reunion, but it resulted in vain. That the respondent used to harass him by sending antisocial elements to his house and office and threatened him with dire consequences. On the other hand, the case of the respondent is of total denial.

G. Suhasini vs. G. Vinod Kumar Reddy (21.09.2022 – TLHC)

25. The main grievance of the petitioner is that the respondent filed false criminal case and domestic violence case against him.

26. It is to be seen that the respondent left the matrimonial house of the petitioner on 3.12.2010, and she filed Crl. No. 161 of 2011 on 7.8.2011 under Section 498-A against the petitioner and his family members, and subsequently she also filed D.V.C. No. 51 of 2016 during the year 2016 i.e., after a period of about six years. Prima facie the ingredients under Section 498-A of IPC and domestic violence are absent in the averments made by the respondent in the counter affidavit.

G. Suhasini vs. G. Vinod Kumar Reddy (21.09.2022 – TLHC)

It is to be seen that if really, the respondent is intending to join the petitioner and lead a peaceful life, definitely she would not have indulged in initiating criminal case and domestic violence case against the petitioner and his family members. The petitioner is a bank employee, and filing of cases would affect his job prospects. Hence, this would definitely cause great mental agony, and would also amount to subjecting the petitioner to ‘mental cruelty’.

28. The Apex Court in RAJ TALREJA v. V. KAVITA TALREJA MANU/SC/0493/2017 : (2017)14 SCC 194, held that “This Court in Para 16 of K. Srinivas Rao v. D.A. Deepa has held as follows: 16. Thus, to the instances illustrative of mental cruelty noted in Samar Ghosh v. Jaya ghosh, MANU/SC/1386/2007 : 2007(4) SCC 511, we could add a few more. Making unfounded indecent defamatory allegations against the spouse or his or her relatives in the pleadings, filing of complaints or issuing notices or news items which may have adverse impact on the business prospect or the job of the spouse and filing repeated false complaints and cases in the court against the spouse would, in the facts of the case, amount to causing mental cruelty to the other spouse.”

29. A Division Bench of this court in P. PADMA v. P. CHENNAIAH MANU/TL/0516/2021 : 2022(1) ALD 103 (TS)(DB), held that false, scandalous, malicious and baseless charges made against husband by wife, prima facie amounts to ‘cruelty’, and on the basis of the same, husband is entitled to decree of divorce.

30. As noted above, since 3.12.2010 the respondent is living in her parental house and she also filed criminal case and domestic violence case against the petitioner and his parents. She also implicated the friend of the petitioner in the criminal case. Further the efforts made by this court to settle the issue between the parties did not yield any result, and the husband is not willing to take the wife back, and the wife is not willing for divorce, and since more than a decade both are living separately. In fact the respondent did not even attend the Mediation Centre and hence the mediation remained unsuccessful.

31. In the decision reported in NAVEEN KOHILI vs. NEELU KOHILI MANU/SC/1387/2006 : AIR 2006 SC 1675 (supra), somewhat similar situation came up for consideration

before the Apex Court. The facts therein disclose that the respondent who is the wife of the appellant, has initiated criminal and civil proceedings and the both are living separately for the past ten years and the marital bond between them was beyond repair, and still the wife is not inclined for divorce. In these facts and circumstances, the Apex Court held that the matrimonial bond between the parties is beyond repair and not to grant a decree of divorce would be disastrous for the parties. Accordingly the order and decree of the trial court in denying the decree of divorce was set aside and the appeal filed by the appellant – husband for a decree of divorce was allowed. The relevant portion of the order is as under:

“Even at this stage, the respondent does not want divorce by mutual consent. From the analysis and evaluation of the entire evidence, it is clear that the respondent has resolved to live in agony only to make life a miserable hell for the appellant as well. This type of adamant and callous attitude, in the context of the facts of this case, leaves no manner of doubt in our mind that the respondent is bent upon treating the appellant with mental cruelty. It is abundantly clear that the marriage between the parties had broken down irretrievably and there is no chance of their coming together, or living together again.

The High Court ought to have appreciated that there is no acceptable way in which the parties can be compelled to resume life with the consort, nothing is gained by trying to keep the parties tied forever to a marriage that in fact has ceased to exist.

Undoubtedly, it is the obligation of the Court and all concerned that the marriage status should, as far as possible, as long as possible and whenever possible, be maintained, but when the marriage is totally dead, in that event, nothing is gained by trying to keep the parties tied forever to a marriage which in fact has ceased to exist. In the instant case, there has been total disappearance of emotional substratum in the marriage. The course which has been adopted by the High Court would encourage continuous bickering, perpetual bitterness and may lead to immorality.

In view of the fact that the parties have been living separately for more than 10 years and a very large number of aforementioned criminal and civil proceedings have been initiated by the respondent against the appellant and some proceedings have been initiated by the appellant against the respondent, the matrimonial bond between the parties is beyond repair. A marriage between the parties is only in name. The marriage has been wrecked beyond the hope of salvage, public interest and interest of all concerned lies in the recognition of the fact and to declare defunct de jure what is already defunct de facto. To keep the sham is obviously conducive to immorality and potentially more prejudicial to the public interest than a dissolution of the marriage bond.

The High Court ought to have visualized that preservation of such a marriage is totally unworkable which has ceased to be effective and would be greater source of misery for the parties.

The High Court ought to have considered that a human problem can be properly resolved by adopting a human approach. In the instant case, not to grant a decree of divorce would be disastrous for the parties. Otherwise, there may be a ray of hope for the parties that after a passage of time (after obtaining a

decree of divorce) the parties may psychologically and emotionally settle down and start a new chapter in life.

In our considered view, looking to the peculiar facts of the case, the High Court was not justified in setting aside the order of the Trial Court. In our opinion, wisdom lies in accepting the pragmatic reality of life and take a decision which would ultimately be conducive in the interest of both the parties.

Consequently, we set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court and direct that the marriage between the parties should be dissolved according to the provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.

32. Further, the Apex Court in the decision reported in SAMAR GHOSH v. JAYA GHOSH MANU/SC/1386/2007 : 2007(4) ALD 11 (SC) (supra), held as under:

“100. (xiv) Where there has been a long period of continuous separation, it may fairly be concluded that the matrimonial bond is beyond repair. The marriage becomes a fiction though supported by a legal tie. By refusing to sever that tie, the law in such cases, does not serve the sanctity of marriage; on the contrary it shows scant regard to the feelings and emotions of the parties. In such like situations, it may lead to mental cruelty.”

33.Having regard to the law laid down by the Apex Court, and the facts and circumstances of the case, this court is of the considered view that the wife by indulging in criminal and civil litigation has made the matrimonial bond beyond repair and subjected the petitioner to ‘mental cruelty’ and on this ground the petitioner is entitled to seek for divorce. The issue framed is answered accordingly.

34. For the foregoing reasons, the impugned order and decree of the trial court is set aside and the O.P. No. 218 of 2012 filed by the petitioner/appellant is allowed and the marriage between the petitioner and the respondent held on 22.08.2010 is dissolved and a decree of divorce is granted to the petitioner.

35. The appeal is accordingly allowed.

Result court granted divorce

Joginder Singh vs. Rajwinder Kaur (29.10.2022 – PHHC)

………But when a person undergoes a trial in which he is acquitted of the allegation of offence under Section 498A of IPC, levelled by the wife against the husband, it cannot be accepted that no cruelty has meted on the husband. As per pleadings before us, after parties having been married on 14.8.2005, they lived together only 18 months and thereafter they are separately living for more

than a decade now.

15. In view of forgoing discussion, we conclude that appellant has made a ground for grant of decree of dissolution of marriage on the ground as mentioned in Section 13(1)(i-a) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.”

14. In yet another case of Kahkashan Kausar @ Sonam v. State of Bihar (SC): Law Finder Doc Id # 1941423,’ the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as follows:

“Further, it is submitted that the FIR in question has been made with a revengeful intent, merely to harass the Appellant in-laws herein, and should be dealt with accordingly. Reliance is placed on Social Action Forum for Manav Adhikar & Anr. v. Union of India, Ministry of Law And Justice & Ors., MANU/SC/0987/2018 : (2018) 10 SCC 443, wherein it was observed:-

“4. Regarding the constitutionality of Section 498A IPC, in Sushil Kumar Sharma v. Union of India and others, it was held by the Supreme Court:-

“Provision of S. 498A of Penal Code is not unconstitutional and ultra vires. Mere possibility of abuse of a provision of law does not per se invalidate a legislation. Hence plea that S. 498A has no legal or constitutional foundation is not tenable. The object of the provisions is prevention of the dowry menace. But many instances have come to light where the complaints are not bona fide and have been filed with oblique motive. In such cases acquittal of the accused does not in all cases wipe out the ignominy suffered during and prior to trial. Sometimes adverse media coverage adds to the misery. The question, therefore, is what remedial measures can be taken to prevent abuse of the well-intentioned provision. Merely because the provision is constitutional and intra vires, does not give a licence to unscrupulous persons to wreck personal vendetta or unleash harassment. It may, therefore, become necessary for the legislature to find out ways how the makers of frivolous complaints or allegations can be appropriately dealt with. Till then the Courts have to take care of the situation within the existing frame-work.””

15. Even this Court in the case of Sushma Taya v Arvind MANU/PH/3556/2014 : 2015 (2) RCR 888 (P&H) held that filing of false criminal complaint by a spouse invariably and inevitably amounts to matrimonial cruelty and entitles the other to claim divorce.

1 6 . Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of A. Jayachandra v Aneel Kaur MANU/SC/1023/2004 : 2005 (2) SCC 22 has held that allegation of cruelty is of such nature that resumption of marriage is not possible.

17. In Raj Talreja v. Kavita Talreja’, MANU/SC/0493/2017 : (2017) 14 SCC 194, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as follows:

“Cruelty can never be defined with exactitude. What is cruelty will depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case. In the present case, from the facts narrated above, it is apparent that the wife made reckless, defamatory and false accusations against her husband, his family members and colleagues, which

would definitely have the effect of lowering his reputation in the eyes of his peers. Mere filing of complaints is not cruelty, if there are justifiable reasons to file the complaints. Merely because no action is taken on the complaint or after trial the accused is acquitted may not be a ground to treat such accusations of the wife as cruelty within the meaning of the Hindu Marriage Act 1955 (for short ‘the Act’). However, if it is found that the allegations are patently false, then there can be no manner of doubt that the said conduct of a spouse levelling false accusations against the other spouse would be an act of cruelty. In the present case, all the allegations were found to be false.”

18. Even otherwise a perusal of the LCR as well as the present appeal, reveals that there are great differences between both parties and they are determined to live separately and to not reconcile the issues between them. As stated above, mediation attempts between the parties have failed. It is not in dispute that the parties have been living separately since October 2013. In our view, this conduct of the parties evidences that there are irreconcilable differences between them, rendering the marriage, as of today, a mere legal fiction. Though irretrievable breakdown of marriage is not available as a ground under the statute, yet, the reality of it has been recognised by the Supreme Court in a catena of decisions.

19. In these circumstances the following observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of ‘K. Srinivas Rao vs. D.A. Deepa’ MANU/SC/0180/2013 : (2013) 5 SCC 226, cover the current controversy:

“25. It is also to be noted that the appellant-husband and the respondent-wife are staying apart from 27/4/1999. Thus, they are living separately for more than ten years. This separation has created an unbridgeable distance between the two. As held in Samar Ghosh, if we refuse to sever the tie, it may lead to mental cruelty.

26. We are also satisfied that this marriage has irretrievably broken down. Irretrievable breakdown of marriage is not a ground for divorce under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. But where marriage is beyond repair on account of bitterness created by the acts of the husband or the wife or of both, the courts have always taken irretrievable breakdown of marriage as a very weighty circumstance amongst others necessitating severance of marital tie. A marriage which is dead for all purposes cannot be revived by the court’s verdict, if the parties are not willing. This is because marriage involves human sentiments and emotions and if they are dried-up there is hardly any chance of their springing back to life on account of artificial reunion created by the court’s decree. …

28. In the ultimate analysis, we hold that the respondent-wife has caused by her conduct mental cruelty to the appellant-husband and the marriage has irretrievably broken down. Dissolution of marriage will relieve both sides of pain and anguish. In this Court has respondent-wife expressed that she wants to go back to the appellant-husband, but, that is not possible now. The appellant husband is not willing to take her back. Even if we refuse decree of divorce to the appellant-husband, there are hardly any chances of the respondent-wife leading a happy life with the appellant-husband because a lot of bitterness is created by the conduct of the respondent wife.”

20. Reference at this stage can be made to the case of ‘Naveen Kohli v. Neelu Kohli’, MANU/SC/1387/2006 : (2006) 4 SCC 558 which was also a case of cruelty (mental and

physical) where the Hon’ble Supreme Court again considered the concept of irretrievable breakdown of marriage. In that case too the parties had been living separately since ten years and the wife was not ready to grant divorce to her husband. However, notwithstanding this factual position, Hon’ble Supreme Court was pleased to grant divorce in said matter and has further noticed as follows:

“32. In ‘Sandhya Rani v. Kalyanram Narayanan’, (1994) Supp. 2 SCC 588, this Court reiterated and took the view that since the parties are living separately for the last more than three years, we have no doubt in our mind that the marriage between the parties has irretrievably broken down. There is no chance whatsoever of their coming together. Therefore, the Court granted the decree of divorce.

33. In the case of ‘Chandrakala Menon v. Vipin Menon’, MANU/SC/0459/1993 : (1993)2 SCC 6, the parties had been living separately for so many years. This Court came to the conclusion that there is no scope of settlement between them because, according to the observation of this Court, the marriage has irretrievably broken down and there is no chance of their coming together. This Court granted decree of divorce.

34. In the case of Kanchan Devi v. Promod Kumar Mittal, MANU/SC/1515/1996 : 1996 (2) RCR (Criminal) 614 : (1996)8 SCC 90, the parties were living separately for more than 10 years and the Court came to the conclusion that the marriage between the parties had to be irretrievably broken down and there was no possibility of reconciliation and therefore the Court directed that the marriage between the parties stands dissolved by a decree of divorce.”

21. Thus, in the conspectus of the peculiar facts and circumstances of the present case, and in consonance with the aforesaid pronouncements of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, with a view to do complete justice, and put an end to the agony of the parties, this Court deems it appropriate to allow the present appeal.

The court further observed that false dowry cases can cause significant emotional and financial harm to the targeted spouse, who may be forced to spend significant amounts of time and money defending themselves against these false allegations. Therefore, the court held that filing false dowry cases can be considered cruelty, which is a valid ground for seeking a divorce.

In conclusion, filing false dowry cases against a spouse is a serious offense that can have severe consequences for both parties involved. In India, false dowry cases can be a basis for seeking a divorce on the grounds of cruelty. The court has recognized the harm caused by false dowry cases and has held that such behavior can lead to an erosion of trust and respect in the marital relationship. Spouses who are subjected to false dowry cases can use the laws against dowry-related abuse as a basis for seeking a divorce.

It is a trend these days that wife alleges allegation in 498a alleging dowry and cruelty..

False 498A accusations can have a significant impact on men, both psychologically and socially. Section 498A is a part of the Indian Penal Code that deals with cruelty by a husband or his family members towards a married woman. Unfortunately, this law is sometimes misused by women to falsely accuse their husband and his family of harassment and cruelty.

Here are some of the ways that false 498A accusations can affect men:

1. Mental stress and trauma: False accusations can cause immense mental stress and trauma, leading to depression, anxiety, and even suicide.
2. Loss of reputation: The social stigma associated with such accusations can cause irreparable damage to a man’s reputation, leading to social isolation and loss of respect in the community.
3. Legal battles: False 498A accusations can lead to lengthy legal battles, which can drain a man’s financial resources and take years to resolve. In some cases, the accused may be arrested and incarcerated without any evidence, which can be a traumatic experience.
4. Loss of job and income: Accusations of harassment can lead to the loss of a man’s job, which can further compound his financial difficulties.
5. Estranged family relationships: False accusations can also strain relationships between the man and his family, leading to broken family ties and social ostracization.

It is important to note that false accusations are a serious matter and can cause significant harm to innocent individuals. The misuse of laws like Section 498A can also undermine the credibility of the legal system and create a sense of mistrust and injustice. It is essential to address the issue of false accusations and ensure that the legal system is fair and just for all.

The respondent-wife has also filed certified copy of the order sheets and petition for divorce, which was earlier filed by the appellant and the said case was registered as CS No. 106-A/1994. The respondent-wife (NAW-1) deposed that the divorce petition filed earlier was dismissed and thereafter she was residing with the appellant for about 2 years at Saraipali and thereafter in the year 2000, she left the appellant and came to Mahasamund. She further admits that after returning to Mahasamund, she lodged an FIR against the appellant and his father for dowry & harassment at Police Station Mahasamund. She further states that she is not aware as to the judgment passed in the said case. The appellant has filed (Ex.-P/1), copy of the judgment dated 19.5.2005 wherein the Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Saraipali, in Criminal Case No. 151/2001, giving benefit of doubt has acquitted the appellant and his father of the charge under Section 498-A of the IPC.

Koman Lal Sahu vs. Sushila Sahu (01.08.2022 – CGHC) : MANU/CG/1338/2022

From the aforesaid evidence, it is explicit that mutual respect and understanding between the parties has completely gone and they are residing separate for more than 20 years, both of them have made allegations and counter allegations against each other and even the wife has made police case, which was resulted into acquittal, so, considering the facts and circumstances of the case, filing of such accusation under Section 498-A of the IPC by the wife against her husband and father-in-law, wherein both have acquitted, also amounts to cruelty. For this, we are fortified in our view by the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Rani Narasimha Sastry Vs. Rani Suneela Rani {MANU/SC/1837/2019 : (2020) 18 SCC 247}. In the said matter, it was observed that it is true that it is open for anyone to file complaint or lodge prosecution for redressal of his or her grievances and lodge a first information report for an offence also and mere lodging of complaint or FIR cannot ipso facto be treated as cruelty. But, when a person undergoes a trial in which he is acquitted of the allegation of offence under Section 498-A IPC, levelled by the wife against the husband, it cannot be accepted that no cruelty has been meted out on the husband.

Koman Lal Sahu vs. Sushila Sahu (01.08.2022 – CGHC) : MANU/CG/1338/2022

Here, are the 6 latest judgments of courts in which FIR registered under 498A got quashed due to presence of vague allegations and false charges against the husband and his family members.

In case of Kamlesh Kalra and Ors. vs. Shilpika Kalra and Ors. (24.04.2020 – SC) court are of the opinion that the allegations of the complainant wife with regard to non-return of the Stridhan articles and the charges Under Section 406 against the husband and his relatives are not sustainable in law. It clearly appears that the filing of the criminal complaint is a pressure tactic, having been employed by the complainant wife against her husband, mother-in-law, brother-in-law and sister-in-law, which is clearly an abuse of the process of Court, and is liable to be quashed in toto.

In case of Kahkashan Kausar and Ors. vs. State of Bihar and Ors. (08.02.2022 – SC)  wife has  instituted a criminal complaint against her husband and his relatives alleging demand for dowry and harassment. Court took cognizance for the offense under Section 498A, 323 Indian Penal Code against the husband and issued summons. This dispute was eventually resolved and subsequently, a another written complaint for registration of FIR against her husband and the Appellants herein alleging Accused of pressurizing the Respondent wife to purchase a car as dowry, and threatened to forcibly terminate her pregnancy if the demands were not met. Aggrieved, the Husband and relatives sought quashing of FIR which was dismissed vide impugned judgment by the High Court. Hence, the present appeal in Supreme Court of India.

Held, while allowing the Appeal SC stated that-

Court has at numerous instances expressed concern over the misuse of Section 498A Indian Penal Code and the increased tendency of implicating relatives of the husband in matrimonial disputes, without analysing the long term ramifications of a trial on the complainant as well as the Accused. Court by way of its judgments has been warned from proceeding against the relatives and in-laws of the husband when no prima facie case is made out against them.

Upon a perusal of the contents of the FIR, it is revealed that general allegations are leveled against the relatives.

Therefore, upon consideration of the relevant circumstances and in the absence of any specific role attributed to the Accused Appellants, it would be unjust if the Appellants are forced to go through the tribulations of a trial, i.e., general and omnibus allegations cannot manifest in a situation where the relatives of the complainant’s husband are forced to undergo trial. A criminal trial leading to an eventual acquittal also inflicts severe scars upon the Accused, and such an exercise must therefore be discouraged.

In view of the above facts and discussions, the impugned order is set aside and FIR quashed in this matter.

In case of Ravinder Kumar and Ors. vs. State of Himachal Pradesh and Ors. (03.01.2020 – HPHC) Present petition seeks quashing of FIR registered against petitioner for offences under Sections 498A, 354, 406 and 34 of IPC. The question is whether FIR impugned herein need to be quashed or not? Held, inherent power with High Court to quash criminal proceedings and FIR – Quashing allowed even in cases which are not compoundable. Power to quash to be exercised with great caution and sparingly. If allegations made are absurd, quashing justified. Where criminal proceeding manifestly attended with mala fide it must be set aside. In present case, no iota of averments or allegations to attract offences as alleged. Continuation of proceedings would tantamount to abuse of process of law. FIR qua present petitioner quashed and set aside.

In case of Nitin Garg vs. State of U.P. and Ors. (06.01.2022 – ALLHC),  petiiton is filed under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. for quashing of FIR filed under Sections 498A, 323 and 506 of IPC and Quashing of charge-sheet and stay of the criminal proceedings. Marriage of the victim solemnised with the applicant on 3.12.2003. Her allegation that accused persons attempted to commit rape upon her. Her husband tried to strangulate her on two occasions. Parties settled their matrimonial dispute before the Supreme Court Mediation Centre on 16.11.2018. Parties have mutually settled of their own free will and a decree under Section 13-B of the Hindu Marriage Act has been passed by the Principal Family Court. In view of the settlement and keeping the position of law in this regard cognizance order dated 7.11.2017 has been taken and FIR is quashedand petition for quashing is allowed by the court.

In case of Gaurav Vij and Ors. vs. State of NCT of Delhi and Ors. (07.09.2021 – DELHC) present petition is filed under Section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC), for quashing of charges under Sections 498A, 306, 201 and 34 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC). The question is whether present petition needs interference. Delhi High Court held that, allegation levelled in suicide note are vague. Petitioners at no time instigated, provoked deceased to commit suicide. Suicide note not capable of being viewed as material for offence. Section 107 IPC not satisfied therefore, no case made in section 306 IPC. Hence, FIR quashed in this matter and Petition is allowed.

In case of Jaimeet Singh Kalra and Ors. vs. State and Ors. (02.06.2022 – DELHC), Criminal – petition is filed for Quashing of FIR under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC). Alleged offences punishable under sections 498A/406/376/34 of Indian Penal Code, 1860 (IPC). Parties living separately due to matrimonial differences and there Disputes settled by way of settlement. Whether in exercise of inherent powers subject FIR also pertaining for non-compoundable offences could be quashed? Court held that, extraordinary power to be exercised sparingly and with great care and caution. Power of compounding and quashing of criminal proceedings in exercise of inherent powers not equal or inter-changeable in law. Parties settled their disputes vide settlement and agreed to dissolve their marriage by mutual consent and also endingtheir pending litigation. Lodging of FIR was outcome of matrimonial discord. In given facts and circumstances, there is remote and bleak possibility of conviction. Petition accordingly allowed and subject FIR quashed.

There are certain questions which need to be answered in law and regularly court clarify or interpret laws that are already provided in statutes so that problems that are happening in society should be resolved successfully. 

Recently, one judgment was passed by the Supreme Court of India that clears interpretation of residential rights provided to women under Domestic Violence Act, 2005. There are many womens who live away from her matrimonial house and many women who does not live with their in laws during the time of filing DV Complaint and here, one major question that comes in mind of women that is – “Should I will be able to get residential right or not?”

Therefore, I have researched and found one of the best judgements where the court has clarified the meaning of shared household and residential rights of women. In para 30 of the judgements in case of ‘Prabha Tyagi Vs. Kamlesh Devi (2022)’ court says that- 

“Further, though, the expression ‘shared household’ is defined in the context of a household where the person aggrieved lives or has lived in a domestic relationship either singly or along with Respondent, in the context of Sub-section (1) of Section 17, the said expression cannot be restricted only to a household where a person aggrieved resides or at any stage, resided in a domestic relationship. In other words, a woman in a domestic relationship who is not aggrieved, in the sense that who has not been subjected to an act of domestic violence by the Respondent, has a right to reside in a shared household. Thus, a mother, daughter, sister, wife, mother-in-law and daughter in-law or such other categories of women in a domestic relationship have the right to reside in a shared household de hors a right, title or beneficial interest in the same. Therefore, the right of residence of the aforesaid categories of women and such other categories of women in a domestic relationship is guaranteed Under Sub-section (1) of Section 17 and she cannot be evicted, excluded or thrown out from such a household even in the absence of there being any form of domestic violence. By contrast, Subsection (2) of Section 17 deals with a narrower right in as much as an aggrieved person who is inevitably a woman and who is subjected to domestic violence shall not be evicted or excluded from the shared household or any part of it by the Respondent except in accordance with the procedure established by law. Thus, the expression ‘right to reside in a shared household’ has to be given an expansive interpretation, in respect of the aforesaid categories of women including a mother-in-law of a daughter-in-law and other categories of women referred to above who have the right to reside in a shared household.”

Now, in para 33 court has given an example so that you can understand whether a wife who is living away has residential right in shared household or not-

“In support of this interpretation, another example may be noted. A woman on getting married, along with her husband may proceed overseas on account of professional or job commitments. Such a woman may not have had an opportunity of residing in the shared household after her marriage. If, for any reason, such a woman becomes an aggrieved person and is forced to return from overseas then she has the right to reside in the shared household of her husband irrespective of whether her husband (Respondent) or the aggrieved person (wife) has any right, title or beneficial interest in the shared household. In such circumstances, parents-in-law of the woman who has returned from overseas and who is an aggrieved person cannot exclude her from the shared household or any part of it except in accordance with the procedure established by law. Another situation is a case where, immediately after marriage, the wife actually resided in the shared household while her husband proceeded overseas. When such a woman is subjected to domestic violence, she cannot be evicted from the shared household except in accordance with the procedure established by law. “

Here, is the brief summary of the whole judgment for better understanding- 

Facts: The aggrieved person (Appellant) filed a complaint alleging domestic violence against her in-laws she suffered after the demise of her husband. As alleged she was denied her stridhan and also her rights in her deceased husbands’ estate. The application filed by aggrieved person was partly allowed and Respondents were directed to pay monetary compensation for insulting and maligning the aggrieved person, besides making available articles of Stridhana. In the appeal preferred by Respondent No. 1, (mother-in-law of the aggrieved person), judgment of the Trial Court was set aside. Thereafter High Court in the impugned judgment held that the aggrieved person had only filed an application alleging domestic violence and since the same was not accompanied by a report, the conditions of Section 12(1) of the D.V. Act were not satisfied. Further, the aggrieved person was residing separately from the Respondents from the day of her marriage and there was no domestic relationship between the aggrieved person and the Respondents, therefore, no relief could be granted under the provisions of the D.V. Act. Hence the present appeal by an aggrieved person. 

Held, while allowing the Appeal:

Section 12 of the D.V. Act states that an aggrieved person or a Protection Officer or any other person on behalf of the aggrieved person may present an application to the Magistrate seeking one or more reliefs under the D.V. Act. [22] While the object and purpose of the D.V. Act is to protect a woman from domestic violence, the salutary object of Sub-section (1) of Section 17 is to confer a right on every woman in a domestic relationship to have the right to reside in a shared household. [27] The D.V. Act is a piece of Civil Code which is applicable to every woman in India irrespective of her religious affiliation and/or social background for a more effective protection of her rights guaranteed under the Constitution and in order to protect women victims of domestic violence occurring in a domestic relationship. Therefore, the expression ‘joint family’ cannot mean as understood in Hindu Law. Thus, the expression ‘family members living together as a joint family’, means the members living jointly as a family. In such an interpretation, even a girl child/children who is/are cared for as foster children also have a right to live in a shared household and are conferred with the right Under Sub-section (1) of Section 17 of the D.V. Act. When such a girl child or woman becomes an aggrieved person, the protection of Sub-section (2) of Section 17 comes into play.[36] It is not mandatory for the aggrieved person to have actually lived or resided with those persons against whom the allegations have been levelled at the time of seeking relief. If a woman has the right to reside in a shared household, she can accordingly enforce her right under Section 17(1) of the D.V. Act. If a woman becomes an aggrieved person or victim of domestic violence, she can seek relief under the provisions of the D.V. Act including her right to live or reside in the shared household under Section 17 read with Section 19 of the D.V. Act.[40] Hence, the Appellant herein had the right to live in a shared household i.e., her matrimonial home and being a victim of domestic violence could enforce her right to live or reside in the shared household under the provisions of the D.V. Act and to seek any other appropriate relief provided under the D.V. Act. This is irrespective of whether she actually lived in the shared household.[41] Even though as on the date of filing of the application before the Magistrate Under Section 12 of the D.V. Act the Appellant was not actually living in the shared household; she nevertheless lived in a domestic relationship with her husband and further had the right to reside in a shared household as a daughter-in-law. The Appellant-aggrieved person had to leave the shared household on account of harassment and mental torture given to her by Respondent – mother-in-law and her family. She had to leave the same and fend for herself. Thus, as an aggrieved person, the Appellant could not have been excluded from the shared household as there was no valid reason to do so. As the Appellant had a right to reside in the shared household as she was in a domestic relationship with her husband till he died in the accident and had lived together with him therefore she also had a right to reside in the shared household despite the death of her husband in a road accident. The aggrieved person continued to have a subsisting domestic relationship owing to her marriage and she being the daughter-in-law had the right to reside in the shared household.[44] An aggrieved person on her own or any other person on behalf of the aggrieved person may present an application to the Magistrate seeking one or more reliefs under the D.V. Act but the proviso states that when a Domestic Incident Reported is received by the Magistrate from the Protection Officer or the service provider, in such a case, the same shall be taken into consideration. Therefore, when an aggrieved person files an application by herself or with the assistance of an advocate and not with the assistance of the Protection Officer or a service provider, in such a case, the role of the Protection Officer or a service provider is not envisaged. Although, the expression ‘shall’ is used in the proviso, it is restricted to only those cases where a Protection Officer files any Domestic Incident Report or, as the case may be, the service provider files such a report. When a Domestic Incident Report is filed by a Protection Officer or a service provider, in such a case the Magistrate has to take into consideration the said report received by him. But if such a report has not been filed on behalf of the aggrieved person then he is not bound to consider any such report. Therefore, the expression ‘shall’ has to be read in the context of a Domestic Incident Report received by a Magistrate from the Protection Officer or the service provider as the case may be in which case, it is mandatory for the Magistrate to consider the report. But, if no such report is received by the Magistrate then the Magistrate is naturally not to consider any such Domestic Incident Report before passing any order on the application. [47] High Court was not right in holding that the application filed by the Appellant herein was not accompanied by aw21 Domestic Incident Report and therefore under the proviso to Sub-section (1) of Section 12 of the D.V. Act, the Magistrate had no authority to issue orders and directions in favour of the Appellant.[48] The three questions raised in this appeal are answered as under: (i) Section 12 does not make it mandatory for a Magistrate to consider a Domestic Incident Report filed by a Protection Officer or service provider before passing any order under the D.V. Act. It is clarified that even in the absence of a Domestic Incident Report, a Magistrate is empowered to pass both ex parte or interim as well as a final order under the provisions of the D.V. Act.; (ii) It is not mandatory for the aggrieved person, when she is related by consanguinity, marriage or through a relationship in the nature of marriage, adoption or are family members living together as a joint family, to actually reside with those persons against whom the allegations have been levelled at the time of commission of domestic violence. If a woman has the right to reside in the shared household Under Section 17 of the D.V. Act and such a woman becomes an aggrieved person or victim of domestic violence, she can seek reliefs under the provisions of D.V. Act including enforcement of her right to live in a shared household; (iii) There should be a subsisting domestic relationship between the aggrieved person and the person against whom the relief is claimed vis-Ã-vis allegation of domestic violence. However, it is not necessary that at the time of filing of an application by an aggrieved person, the domestic relationship should be subsisting. [52]

Quashing of FIR for the offence of rape is quite rare in legal field as it is a heinious crime. As this is offence against society at large and that’s why it is very difficult to discharge the accused in such matters.

However, in some peculiar circumtances this FIR can be quashed when it is for the future development of the complainant and when complainant herself request for quashing of such FIR.

Nowadays, wives for the extortion of money and harassment of the husband and his relatives files cases of sexual offence against them. They use these sensitive FIRs as a trap for them as they are women oriented sections and accused are not very easily get discharge from these cases.

While this is very sensitive matter and thats why courts also take these matters very seriously but nowadays courts looking at these matters very actively and giving very formulative orders.

Few days back one of client came to me for quashing of FIR filed against him under section 376 of Indian Penal Code then I firstly I have suggested him to go for settlement and then the settlement is done between the parties.

After that the quashing petition is filed in Delhi High Court and we have argued the matter and presented some of the jugements of Supreme Court and High Court where court has quashed this FIR based on compromise between the parties.

Here, I have discussed the case which is from our firm and we have successfully able to give relief to our client and FIR is quashed by Delhi High Court.i.e.,

In Sumeert Rathore &ORS Vs. State, the Delhi High Court has recently quashed charges of 376/354/498a/406/34 IPC. In this case initially court was reluctant to quash charges of 376 IPC but we gave a supreme court judgement.. Kapil Gupta v. State of NCT of Delhi, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1030, while quashing an FIR under Section 376 IPC, had observed as under: “…13. It can thus be seen that this Court has clearly held that though the Court should be slow in quashing the proceedings wherein heinous and serious offences are involved, the High Court is not foreclosed from examining as to whether there exists material for incorporation of such an offence or as to whether there is sufficient evidence which if proved would lead to proving the charge for the offence charged with. The Court has also to take into consideration as to whether the settlement between the parties is going to result into harmony between them which may

improve their mutual relationship. 14. The Court has further held that it is also relevant to consider as to what is stage of the proceedings. It has been observed that if an application is made at a belated stage wherein the evidence has been led and the matter is at the stage of arguments or judgment, the Court should be slow to exercise the power to quash the proceedings. However, if such an application is made at an initial stage before commencement of trial, the said factor will weigh with the court in exercising its power…”The case was quashed by the High Court on the ground that complainant do not want to proceed with the case

Here, are the other cases where court has quashed FIR filed under section 376 of IPC-

Arshad Ahmad & Ors v. State of NCT of Delhi (Criminal Writ Petition Case No. 1185 of 2022 & Criminal Miscellaneous Application Case No. 10056 of 2022)

FACTS OF THE CASE: Brief facts of the case are as follows; A petition was filed for quashing an FIR registered under Sections 376/377/498-A of the IPC. The charge sheet had been filed under Section 376 of the IPC, but, in her statement given under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CrPC), the complainant stated that her father-in-law had made only a rape attempt. The complainant told the Court that she had entered into a compromise out of her own free will and had no objection to quashing the FIR.

JUDGEMENT: After reviewing the submissions of both the sides, the Court observed that the practice of registering cases under Sections 376 (rape), 354 (assaulting a woman) and 498A (husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty) of the Indian Penal Code (IPC), which are later brought to Court for quashing, needs to be curbed. The Court quashed a First Information Report (FIR) registered by the woman against her father-in-law after finding that the parties had reached a compromise. “The fact that nowadays Sections 376 and 354 of IPC are being used along with Section 498-A IPC, which later are compromised and are brought to the court for quashing, needs to be curbed,” read the Court’s order.

The Court said that cases under Section 376 IPC should not be quashed in ordinary circumstances and should be viewed as crimes against society at large. However, in the peculiar circumstances of the matrimonial dispute case, where the woman said that her future depends on the quashing of the FIR and that rape was not committed upon her, it will be in the interest of justice that if the FIR in its entirety is quashed, the Court ruled. While noting that the complainant had received a demand draft of ₹10 lakh towards the compromise, the Court saw it fit to quash the case, convinced that doing so would ensure a better future for all the parties. Because of the “overall facts and circumstances of the case. The Court appreciated the stand taken by the complainant and stated, “The complainant is a young lady who is looking for a bright future for herself, which depends on quashing of the present FIR according to a settlement which she states before this Court, she has entered out of her free will and without coercion, pressure or threat. She also stated that it was a family dispute, and she no longer wants the same to be tried in any Court of law.” The Court said that any case coming to an end was a welcome step as it decreased the pendency of the courts.

In case of VIKAS KUMAR &ORS. Vs. THE STATE & ANR., 2022 the Delhi High Court have quashed the FIR filed under section 376 IPC on basis of compromise which was filed against Father-in-law and Brother-in-law by the complainant.

In case of KAPIL GUPTA Vs. STATE OF NCT OF DELHI & ANR.,2022, SC has quashed the FIR filed under section 376 IPC as the matter was amicably settled and therefore, the petition for quashing the proceedings under section 482 of Cr. P.C. is allowed by the court. Court has considered that the main purpose of the court is provide justice to the complainant and where complainant herself settled the matter then court can allow quashing as this essential step toward development of her future.

Though ordinarily, cases under Section 376 IPC should not be quashed and should be taken as a crime against the society at large, however, in the peculiar circumstances of this matrimonial dispute case where the complainant states that her future depends on quashing of the FIR and states that rape was not committed upon her, it will be in the interest of justice that if the FIR in its entirety is quashed, in these matters.

Bonus Judgement–Our Firm Case…In Sumeert Rathore &ORS Vs. State the Delhi High Court has recently quashed charges of 376/354/498a/406/34 IPC. In this case initially court was reluctant to quash charges of 376 IPC but we gave a supreme court judgement.. Kapil Gupta v. State of NCT
of Delhi, 2022 SCC OnLine SC 1030, while quashing an FIR under Section
376 IPC, had observed as under:
“…13. It can thus be seen that this Court has clearly held that
though the Court should be slow in quashing the proceedings
wherein heinous and serious offences are involved, the High
Court is not foreclosed from examining as to whether there exists
material for incorporation of such an offence or as to whether
there is sufficient evidence which if proved would lead to proving
the charge for the offence charged with. The Court has also to
take into consideration as to whether the settlement between the
parties is going to result into harmony between them which may
improve their mutual relationship.

14. The Court has further held that it is also relevant to consider
as to what is stage of the proceedings. It has been observed that
if an application is made at a belated stage wherein the evidence
has been led and the matter is at the stage of arguments or
judgment, the Court should be slow to exercise the power to
quash the proceedings. However, if such an application is made
at an initial stage before commencement of trial, the said factor
will weigh with the court in exercising its power…”The case was quashed by the High Court on the ground that complainant do not want to proceed with the case

Maintenance is a amount that is paid to wife, children and parents who are not able to maintain themselves. In general, it is basically “support or subsistence.” It is typically pays for the costs of essentials or requirements for the stuff of life.

However, it is not just a right to the claimant’s survival but also the capacity to work of the husband or wife, their behavior and other considerations will all be taken into account by the court when deciding how much maintenance should be paid.

Many of matrimonial cases which I handle in day to day life are based on vague allegations and malicious intention. Most of the maintenance cases filed by wife are only for the extortion of money from the husband.

Here, I have researched on few judgments that are favor of husband that help them in there maintenance case-

1. In case of Abdulmunaf v. Salima: 1979, Wife is capable of earning in view of her being a nor mal healthy person and educated up to
2.  SSLC, but she has not taken care to earn anything for herself-That disentitles her to full amount that she has claimed, but contention of husband that her application for maintenance is liable to be rejected, cannot be accepted-Refusal to earning by such wife may be taken into consideration while considering quantum of maintenance.

3. In Kavita Prasad v. Ram Ashray Prasad 2009, Trial court granted maintenance of rupees four thousand per month then petition against observation of trial court that she was working somewhere and earning around rupees eight to ten thousand per month and maintenance granted by trial court was made subject to adjustment of maintenance being received by her under Section 125 of CrPC. Wife pleaded unemployed, despite being a qualified doctor. Court consider that as petitioner is receiving maintenance from her husband, she should be directed to work as a honorary Doctor in some public welfare institute or school free of charges where she can take care of health of poor people.

4. In case of Anil v. Sunita (2016), Non-applicant/wife resided in her matrimonial home for the first time for 7 days and second time for 12 days and it is alleged that in these 12 days she was harassed. It is practically impossible that she could have been so harassed that it is impossible for her to live in her matrimonial home. After 12 days she had voluntarily gone with her brother with a view to select a girl for marriage of her brother. Non-applicant-wife has not made any complaint to anybody or lodged a report to police station. It cannot be held that she was thrown with force from her matrimonial home or she was forced to leave her matrimonial home. Non-applicant-wife is residing separately without any reason, hence, she is not entitled for maintenance under Section 125 of CrPC and order granting maintenance to wife set aside. 

5. In case of Deb Narayan Halder v. Anushree Halder (Smt.): 2003 it was held that if demand of dowry and cruelty by husband is not supported by evidence on record and reasons given for her ill-treatment are not existed and if wife leaves the matrimonial home without any justifiable ground then she is not entitled for any maintenance.

6. In case of Shibani Roy v. Shambhu Nath Roy: 2007, it was held that torture and harassment to wife not established on the basis of evidence adduced Wife is not at all interested to live with her husband and she is staying in her mother’s house without any sufficient reason or just cause. Wife not entitled to claim any maintenance from her hus band as she herself left residence of the husband voluntarily.

Domestic violence is a very sensitive issue to address in the legal system due to numerous incidents of vague allegations and false cases implicating the Innocents in the Relationship.

Although on the one face of the coin, Number of women are facing Domestic violence and choose to be silent in the society for the sake of their relationship, but on the other side of the coin, many womens are using this as a tool to harass and falsely implicate the husband and his family in the false Domestic violence case on the vague allegations. 

I regularly witness various cases where a wife has made false and vague allegations against the husband and his family and despite being innocent they face huge difficulties to get themselves out from this pool of allegations against them. 

Being a defense lawyer in most such cases, the court too notices the fact that in many cases, the allegations made by wife is false and vague but because of the compliance of court procedures, the court cannot make it very clear on record without letting both the sides top present their evidences and statements to support their case. 

What can we consider ?

There is a Judgment passed by Hon’ble supreme court of India in case of Kamlesh Devi Vs. Jaipal & Ors, where the Hon’ble court found that the allegations made by the wife against the husband and his family members are vague. The Ingredients to support Domestic violence were absent in the present case as the Petitioner and the Respondents were not living in the shared household. You can also use this judgment to support your defense case against the false allegations. 

What are the basic allegations which a court can consider to be checked twice of its authenticity ?

1. Whether the wife was living with you and your family members in a shared household – In many cases, even if wife was not living with husband’s family members, she implicate them falsely in a false case of Domestic violence which is a major ingredient to frame a Domestic violence case that the accused’s should have lived with the complainant in a shared household after marriage. 

2. Whether the accused are even the family members of the husband or not –  In the above mentioned case, the supreme court found that the Respondents were not even family members but neighbors. There was not even a whisper of incidents mentioned by the complainant with the Accuseds ( Relatives). 

3. Whether the allegations are specific or not – In many cases, the complainant mentions the allegations which are not even directly related to incidents which proves that the allegation made is vague. 

Judgment PDF

The Hindu Marriage Act of 1955, which governs the law relating to Indian marriages between Hindus, and the Special Marriage Act of 1954, which governs the law relating to all Indian marriages regardless of religious denominations, contain an identical ground for divorce: “cruelty” after solemnization of the marriage.

Matrimonial matters are matters of delicate human and emotional relationship. It demands mutual trust, regard, respect, love and affection with sufficient play for reasonable adjustments with the spouse. The relationship has to conform to the social norms as well. The matrimonial conduct has now come to be governed by statute framed, keeping in view such norms and changing social order.

However cruelty is legally defined in law. Here are some of the judgments of courts related to mental cruelty on the basis of which divorce is granted in favor of the husband.

Impact of mental cruelty on matrimonial life

Prior to the 1976 amendment in the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 cruelty was not a ground for claiming divorce under the Hindu Marriage Act. It was only a ground for claiming judicial separation under Section 10 of the Act. By 1976 Amendment, the Cruelty was made ground for divorce. The words, which have been incorporated, are “as to cause a reasonable apprehension in the mind of the petitioner that it will be harmful or injurious for the petitioner to live with the other party”.

Legal provisions related to cruelty

The Hindu Marriage Act-1955 has given the legal provision for divorce on basis of cruelty under section – 13(1)(ia) as follows;

“Any marriage solemnized, whether before or after the commencement of this Act, may, on a petition presented by either the husband or the wife, be dissolved by a decree of divorce on the ground that the other party has, after the solemnization of the marriage, treated the petitioner with cruelty”.

On basis of this section we can explain this legal basis for the divorce as anybody who is getting suffer from the other party in physical manner or a mental torture or any other type of harassment then the other can reach to the court with this base and claim for the divorce. And there are various cases where courts held that the intention to be cruel is not an essential element of cruelty as envisaged under this section.

Case laws in which divorce is granted in favor of husbands related to mental cruelty…..

In case of Samar Ghosh vs Jaya Ghosh (2007) (Supreme Court), which deals with a matrimonial dispute between two IAS officers. The husband alleged that his wife made a unilateral decision to not have a child and did not allow him to show affection to her daughter (from her first marriage). Further, she showed scant regard for his health, refused to cook for him and asked him to leave her flat, thereby humiliating him, and refused to cohabit with him. The court found that the wife’s conduct amounted to mental cruelty and restored the decision of the trial court which granted the husband divorce.

In case of Vishwanath vs. Sarla Vishwanath Agrawal, 2012  it was established that a sustained attitude of causing humiliation and calculated torture on part of wife to make life of husband miserable and husband felt humiliated both in private and public life with this mental pain, agony and suffering, Husband could not be asked to put up with conduct of wife and to continue to live with her. Therefore, he was entitled to a decree for divorce. Although, permanent alimony was to be granted taking into consideration social status, conduct of parties, way of living of spouse and such other ancillary aspected. Finally the appeal of the husband was allowed in this matter and divorce decree is granted in favor of the husband.

In case of Malathi Ravi vs. B.V. Ravi (30.06.2014 – SC)  High Court reversed decree for restitution of conjugal rights granted in favor of Wife and decreed dissolution of marriage by way of divorce allowing petition preferred by Husband. Hence, present appeal is filed whether impugned order rightly reversed the decree for restitution of conjugal rights by granting divorce. It was held that the wife failed to prove her allegation on account of conflicts with sister and brother-in-law. Wife herself has admitted that husband had given his consent for her higher education and, in fact, assisted her. Husband had been treated with mental cruelty by wife as he had faced ignominy. Moreover, despite the husband’s request to come to the house, the wife showed disinclination. Husband was likely to lament in every breath and the vibrancy of life melted to give way to the sad story of life. Hence, impugned order passing the decree for divorce had been affirmed in favor of husband.

Conclusion

By looking at the above judgements we can get an idea that a husband can get divorce by establishing  mental cruelty by wife wife by putting wrong grounds and filing false cases against husband and later on failed to prove that.

Here, are the 5 latest judgements of courts in which FIR registered under 498A got quashed due to presence of vague allegations and false charges against the husband and his family members.

In case of Kahkashan Kausar and Ors. vs. State of Bihar and Ors. (08.02.2022 – SC)  wife has  instituted a criminal complaint against her husband and his relatives alleging demand for dowry and harassment. Court took cognizance for the offense under Section 498A, 323 Indian Penal Code against the husband and issued summons. This dispute was eventually resolved and subsequently, a another written complaint for registration of FIR against her husband and the Appellants herein alleging Accused of pressurizing the Respondent wife to purchase a car as dowry, and threatened to forcibly terminate her pregnancy if the demands were not met.Aggrieved, the Husband and re;atives sought quashing of FIR which was dismissed vide impugned judgment by the High Court. Hence, the present appeal in Supreme Court of India.

Held, while allowing the Appeal SC stated that-

Court has at numerous instances expressed concern over the misuse of Section 498A Indian Penal Code and the increased tendency of implicating relatives of the husband in matrimonial disputes, without analysing the long term ramifications of a trial on the complainant as well as the Accused. Court by way of its judgments has been warned from proceeding against the relatives and in-laws of the husband when no prima facie case is made out against them.

Upon a perusal of the contents of the FIR, it is revealed that general allegations are leveled against the relatives.

Therefore, upon consideration of the relevant circumstances and in the absence of any specific role attributed to the Accused Appellants, it would be unjust if the Appellants are forced to go through the tribulations of a trial, i.e., general and omnibus allegations cannot manifest in a situation where the relatives of the complainant’s husband are forced to undergo trial. A criminal trial leading to an eventual acquittal also inflicts severe scars upon the Accused, and such an exercise must therefore be discouraged.

In view of the above facts and discussions, the impugned order is set aside and FIR quashed in this matter.

In case of Kamlesh Kalra and Ors. vs. Shilpika Kalra and Ors. (24.04.2020 – SC) court are of the opinion that the allegations of the complainant wife with regard to non-return of the Stridhan articles and the charges Under Section 406 against the husband and his relatives are not sustainable in law. It clearly appears that the filing of the criminal complaint is a pressure tactic, having been employed by the complainant wife against her husband, mother-in-law, brother-in-law and sister-in-law, which is clearly an abuse of the process of Court, and is liable to be quashed in toto.

In case of Ravinder Kumar and Ors. vs. State of Himachal Pradesh and Ors. (03.01.2020 – HPHC) petition seeks quashing of FIR registered against petitioner for offences under Sections 498A, 354, 406 and 34 of IPC – Whether FIR impugned herein need to be quashed. It was  held that inherent power with High Court to quash criminal proceedings and FIR. Quashing allowed even in cases which are not compoundable. Power to quash to be exercised with great caution and sparingly. If allegations made are absurd, quashing justified. Where criminal proceeding manifestly attended with mala fide it must be set aside. In present case, no iota of averments or allegations to attract offences as alleged. Continuation of proceedings would tantamount to abuse of process of law and FIR qua present petitioner quashed and set aside.

In case of Anupam Mahajan and Ors. vs. State of Himachal Pradesh and Ors. (02.01.2020 – HPHC) petition seeks quashing of FIR registered against petitioner for offences under Sections 498A, 354, 406 and 34 of IPC and this case as well FIR is quashed and set aside as If allegations made are absurd then quashing is justified Where criminal proceeding manifestly attended with mala fide it must be set aside. In present case, no iota of averments or allegations to attract offences as alleged and Continuation of proceedings would tantamount to abuse of process of law.

In case of RUBI & ORS. VS. STATE OF U.P. & ANR. On 16 March 2007 court established a opinion that summoning of younger members of family, unjustified. At stage of summoning it is not law that even younger members of family be also summoned to stand trial along with elders even though no specific allegation made against them and their complicity in crime prima facie mala fide and purposive-Levelling general allegations against all family members including unmarried younger girls and boys without specification is practice to be curbed because it will amount to great injustice to ask unmarried younger daughters and brothers to stand trial only because of their relationship with husband.

In this article I will cover 8 grounds with Judgments held in the field on the grounds how maintenance can be denied to the wife.

The Five Ground are

1. Wife Living separately without sufficient cause.
2. Wife living in Adultery
3. Professionally qualified wife-Capable of earning
4. Separated by mutual consent
5. Earning wife
6. Woman who contracts Second Marriage
7. Woman against whom Decree of Restitution has been passed
8. Where divorce was granted against a woman on her fault

Wife Living separately without sufficient cause.

This ground is very simple but needs effective cross examination. In this ground the onus is on the wife to explain why she is living separately with the husband.

In the Judgement of Smt Teja Bai Vs. Chiddu Armo Jabalpur High Court it was observed

High Court observed “It is evident that petitioner applicant No.1 is wife of respondent. Petitioner-applicant No.1 admitted in her cross-examination that respondent does not do any work due to illness, so she left his house and she is living in her paternal home with her child. She is not ready to live with the respondent. So, it is evident that petitioner No.1 is living separately from her husband-respondent, without any sufficient reason. Therefore, the learned trial court appreciates each and every fact in this regard so petitioner-application No.1 is not entitled to get any maintenance from her husband…”

In the Judgement of Anil Jain Vs. Smt Sunita it was observed.

Wife resided with the husband for 12 days and in these 12 days the wife was in constant touch with her brother. She had a mobile phone and in the entire period of stay she never complained to her brother regarding any cruelty. it is not possible that any cruelty was done to her. She left her home as per own will

Maintenance denied..

Wife living in Adultery

Now it is very interesting, the Husband has the onus to prove that the wife living in adultery is not entitled to maintenance.

But the interesting thing about this ground is that it is not applicable to divorce wife.

Mariyumma vs Mohammed Ibrahim on 28 June, 1978

Though there is no requirement of joint residence in the case of a divorced wife with her divorced husband the learned Judges seem to assume that the Idea behind Sub-section (4) of Section 1 ’25 is to promote a process of reconciliation between the divorced spouses. We see no justification to assume so. On the other hand, the question is whether there is an obligation on any of the parties to the divorce to live with the other and whether any one of the parties can insist upon the exercise of right to live with the other even where the other is not willing. We are afraid, the answer can only be negative. Sub-section (4) cannot hence logically apply to the case of a divorced woman.

Professionally qualified wife-Capable of earning

If the wife is capable of earning and is well qualified she is not entitled for maintenance now Three judgments are in this field.

In a recent Judgment by Delhi Session court filed under appeal u/s. 29 of DV act the court ordered wife to find a suitable job and held that maintenance order is valid for 1 year only

Case link Rajan Parmar Vs Mamta Parmar

In Padmja Sharma vs Ratan Lal Sharma on 28 March, 2000

In the present case both the parents are employed. If we refer to the first application filed under Section 26 of the Act by the wife she mentions that she is getting a salary of Rs. 3,100 per month and husband is getting a salary of Rs. 5,850 per month. She is, therefore, also obliged to contribute in the maintenance of the children. Salaries of both the parents have since increased with the course of time. We believe that in the same proportion, perhaps in the case of an employee of Reserve Bank of India at a somewhat higher rate. If the approximate salary of the husband is twice as much as that of the wife, they are bound to contribute for maintenance of their children in that proportion. The Family Court has already fixed a sum of Rs.. 250 per month for each of the children under Section 125 of the Code. That amount we need not touch.

In Sri R Ravindra vs Smt N Anitha on 10 April, 2018 it was held

Moreover, considering the fact that the respondent No.1 may have some capacity to earn, the learned Family Court has not imposed the complete, and sole responsibility of having to pay the educational expenses of the child, on the petitioner’s shoulders. In its wisdom, the learned Family Court has directed the petitioner to pay merely 75% of the educational expenses, thereby indicating that 25% of the educational expenses have to be borne by the respondent No.1.

In Dr. E. Shanthi vs Dr. H.K. Vasudev on 22 August, 2005 it was held

Admittedly, petitioner is residing with her parents at Chennai and whose brother is also a doctor. When the petitioner was practicing prior to marriage, when her name continues on the board of the clinic, the Trial Court is justified in rejecting the application of the petitioner. There is no difficulty for the petitioner to work as a Doctor. Even if the petitioner is not working as a doctor in the clinic of her brother, since there are no impediments for her to work along with her brother as a doctor and when she is capable of earning, this Court is of the opinion that the Trial Court is justified in rejecting the application of the petitioner. When the petitioner is capable of earning and having required qualification and that when she was working as a doctor prior to marriage, there cannot be any difficulty for her to continue the same profession. Therefore, Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act cannot come to the aid of such persons. Accordingly, this petition has to be rejected.

About Income Affidavit

Separated by mutual consent

Now if there is an agreement that both spouses are living separately and will not claim maintenance then this can be a ground to deny maintenance.

But what about cases in which maintenance is granted after mutual consent divorce

The Judgement of Rohtash Singh vs Smt. Ramendri And Ors on 2 March, 2000

The second ground on which she would not be entitled to Maintenance Allowance is the ground of her refusal to live with her husband without any sufficient reason. This also presupposes the subsistence of marital relations between the parties. If the marriage subsists, the wife is under a legal and moral obligation to live with her husband and to fulfil the marital obligations. She cannot, without any sufficient reason, refuse to live with her husband. “Sufficient reasons” have been interpreted differently by the High Courts having regard to the facts of indivisual cases. We are not required to go into that question in the present case as admittedly the marriage between the parties came to an end on account of a decree for divorce having been passed by the Family Court. Existence of sufficient cause on the basis of which the respondent could legitimately refuse to live with the petitioner is not relevant for the present case. In this situation, the only question which survives for consideration is whether a wife against whom a decree for divorce has been passed on account of her deserting the husband can claim Maintenance Allowance under Section 125 Cr. P.C. and how far can the plea of desertion be treated to be an effective plea in support of the husband’s refusal to pay her the Maintenance Allowance.

Earning wife

In the Judgement of Chaturbhuj vs Sita Bai on 27 November, 2007

In an illustrative case where the wife was surviving by begging, would not amount to her ability to maintain herself. It can also be not said that the wife has been capable of earning but she was not making an effort to earn. Whether the deserted wife was unable to maintain herself, has to be decided on the basis of the material placed on record. Where the personal income of the wife is insufficient she can claim maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C. The test is whether the wife is in a position to maintain herself in the way she was used to in the place of her husband. In Bhagwan v. Kamla Devi(AIR 1975 SC 83) it was observed that the wife should be in a position to maintain standard of living which is neither luxurious nor penurious but what is consistent with status of a family. The expression “unable to maintain herself” does not mean that the wife must be absolutely destitute before she can apply for maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C.

Maintenance can be denied on the basis of Preliminary Issue of

1. Jurisdiction-If the case is not maintainable due to the fact that wife was not the resident at time of filing of the petition then the Maintenance case can be dismissed at preliminary stage.
2. If wife is is earning and capable of maintenance herself. maintenance cannot be granted in such a situation but these facts should be part of records.

Woman who contracts Second Marriage

: This seems logical corollary to the above, a woman who contracts second marriage forfeits her right to maintenance. If the woman contracts for second marriage then the husband from the first marriage can avoid the maintenance of her wife in India. The same can be considered continuous adultery if contracted while in the existence of the first marriage. And if the woman is educated then no alimony to educated wife as she can maintain herself.

Woman against whom Decree of Restitution has been passed

This is corollary to the above, a decree of restitution of conjugal rights is a proof of wife’s withdrawal without a reasonable excuse and would be considered willful refusal to live with the husband. However, courts are divided on the issue whether an ex- parte decree of Restitution of Conjugal Rights is enough. The courts then look at the conduct of the wife in such cases, whether she was served notice, has she challenged the decree or not. Husband’s conduct after passing of decree is also looked at by the courts. If the husband despite getting a decree in his favor, does not allow the wife to reside with him despite her efforts would still have to pay maintenance. The maintenance to wife needs to given.

Where divorce was granted against a woman on her fault

 Though a divorced wife is eligible to claim maintenance even where initially she lives apart from her husband without just cause, the guilt or fault of the woman hinges heavy on the quantum of maintenance which is granted by the courts. Under Section 25 of HMA, the conduct of the parties is one of the deciding factors while deciding permanent alimony in the courts. There are numerous decisions by High Courts where a woman was divorced on the grounds of Adultery, Cruelty and Desertion, where courts have either refused or granted minimal maintenance to wife.